Essays, op-eds and letters
Alex Bäcker
Letter · Pasadena, March 18, 1996
A reply to "Dancing Qualia in a Synthetic Brain", in "The Puzzle of Conscious Experience" by D. J. Chalmers, Scientific American, December 1995, p. 86. Written at the California Institute of Technology.
David Chalmer's conclusion that systems with the same organization have the same conscious experience appears to be based upon the assumption that a person's behavior has a unique and unchangeable relationship with what the person consciously experiences. Evidence from neurological patients, however, suggests that dissociations exist between different brain processes that seemed a priori unseparable and that the actions of a primate are subject to manipulation (see Newsome et al., for example). For example, a hemiplegic patient can experience the desire to move his paralyzed leg, and yet he cannot move it. Thus, if we were to judge his conscious experience by his motor response alone, we would erroneously interpret he has the same conscious experience as a normal man who does not wish to move his leg. Also, if we electrically stimulate the neurons or muscle cells controlling tongue and mouth movements, we could presumably produce any verbal output, and yet not produce any sensation.
In the same way, if we replace a part of a human brain that is at least partly responsible for a conscious experience with an analogous part of a system with no (or different) conscious experience that provides the same output to other areas (as Chalmer's thought experiment suggests), the other parts of the brain (including the cells controlling speech) will have no way of knowing any difference, and yet the conscious experience will have vanished or changed. Even if we switch back and forth between the brain part and its analog, if its outputs are the same, the rest of the brain will have no way of knowing, even if the experiences do vary between the switches. Thus, the statement "You will hold that you are seeing red and have seen nothing but red -even though the two colors are dancing before your eyes. This conclusion is so unreasonable that it is best taken as a reduction ad absurdum..." does not appear justifiable.
The phrase "...a silicon-based system in which the chips are organized and function in the same way as the neurons in your brain" seems ambiguous, if not contradictory. The analogy must assume a difference at some level, or it would not employ silicon; if the silicon chips are assumed to have ALL properties equal to the (carbon-based) brain, the question asked is trivial, by definition. The same is true if the statement is meant as "in the same ways in all properties relevant to consciousness". Thus, some levels of similarity must be assumed, leaving room for differences. The crucial question, precisely, is where that line must be drawn: what is the essence or defining elements of consciousness (and what is not). It appears arbitrary at this point to say that consciousness only depends on the properties above some level, e.g. the cellular level. We have no evidence that subcellular mechanisms are not relevant, or that the similarity could not be at a higher level and yet entail equal consciousness.